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Like those famous nations divided by a single tongue, my paper (this volume) and Professor 
P.M. Churchland's deep and engaging reply offer different spins on a common heritage. The 
common heritage is, of course, a connectionist vision of the inner neural economy- a vision 
which depicts that economy in terms of supra-sentential state spaces, vector-to-vector 
transformations, and the kinds of skillful pattern-recognition routine we share with the bulk of 
terrestrial intelligent life-forms. That which divides us is, as ever, much harder to isolate and 
name. Clearly, it has something to do with the role of moral talk and exchange, and something to 
do with the conception of morality itself (and, correlatively, with the conception of moral 
progress). Most of this Reply will be devoted to clarifying the nature of the disputed territory. 
First, though (as a prophylactic against misunderstanding) I shall rehearse some points of 
agreement concerning moral talk and progress. 
 
Professor Churchland and I agree that words, talk, moral labels, and the whole collective 
infrastructure of moral texts, rules, traditions, tools and practices matter. We agree, indeed, that it 
is this species-specific overlay that gives human thought and reason (in science, morals, and 
elsewhere) much of its distinctive power and character. Thus Churchland recognizes and 
emphasizes "the genuine novelty represented by the evolutionary emergence of language and the 
cultural emergence of discursive rules", and depicts this novelty as something that "extends the 
reach and elevates the quality of the original non discursive cognition". Furthermore, we agree 
that words, texts and technologies are, taken alone, cognitively and morally inert, so that "even 
when that external machinery does get deployed, it is the original and more basic form of 
cognition that does the deploying. Rules are useless unless the capacity for reliable perception of 
their categories is already in place, and such perception depends utterly on the inarticulable 
processes of vector coding and prototype activation". We agree also that even our best moral 
rules, maxims and guidelines (even God's own moral rules, maxims and guidelines, were God 
forced to formulate them as sentences in some Earthly tongue) are not to be viewed as displaying 
the full, rich content of our own (or God's) achieved moral expertise. Instead, the rules, maxims 
and guidelines play a kind of facilitating role. They act as reference points for collaborative 
moral reasoning and discussion, and they sow the seeds for deeper and more penetrating moral 
thought (for example, by providing summary labels which can support the discovery of deeper, 
more abstract, otherwise cognitively invisible, moral concepts- as per the discussion of pan 
troglodytes in my text). And we agree, finally (though here I suspect I was not clear in the text) 
that there can be, and indeed has been, genuine moral progress. I concur wholeheartedly with 
professor Churchland's forceful description of the many moral mistakes and attitudes enshrined 
in the Bible and believe, as he does, that many contemporary moral norms represent substantial 
advances over that primitive foray into moral space. 
 
Where, then, do we disagree? We disagree, I suggest, on two (related) counts. 
 
First, we disagree on the precise role of all that external scaffolding and moral infrastructure. As 
Professor Churchland _as it, the role of the scaffolding is largely to offload, preserve, stockpile 
and share our collective moral wisdom and experience. And moral wisdom itself is conceived as 
a kind of know-how concerning the successful navigation of social space, a type of know-how 
we thus share with many other social animals including "baboon troops, wolf packs, dolphin 
schools, chimpanzee groups, lion prides". What we find in such cases, Churchland suggests, is 
"the same complex ebb and flow of thoughtful sharing, mutual defense, fair competition, familial 
sacrifice, staunch alliance, minor deception, major treachery, and the occasional outright 
ostracism that we see displayed in human societies." 
 
What we do not find, he notes, is the peculiar kind of discursive language-use or highly 
articulated non-biological infrastructure that characterizes human societies.  As a result, in the 
case of other social animals "their social cognition is conducted entirely within the more 
primitive and nondiscursive form of cognition". The specific social spaces we might navigate 
are, Churchland allows, deeply transformed by these extra layers of infrastructure. But the 
discursive infrastructures, Churchland insists, "do not bring moral reasoning into existence for 
the first time, and they do not provide a conceptual model remotely adequate to the phenomenon 
of moral cognition in single individuals and nonhuman animals" Moral understanding, it seems, 
is a more primitive thing. 
 
 
Here, then, is the first point of real disagreement. For on my account, our practices of moral talk 
and exchange, and our collective efforts to create the kinds of abstract, shared conceptions (of 
'charity' 'rights' 'equality' 'opportunity' etc.) that such discussions require are part of what 
constitutes our practices as genuinely moral in the first place. I do not dispute, in any way, 
Professor Churchland's depiction of nonlinguistic animals as navigating social spaces. But I do 
dispute the apparent direct assimilation of such skilled navigation to moral activity. There is, I 
maintain, a sufficiently profound difference between our human moral projects and the project of 
successful social navigation to justify treating the latter, but not the former, as distinctively moral 
modes of thought and reason. Such modes are marked, for example, by the requirement to 
provide reasons for our actions, and to be able to address the important question of the 
acceptability, or otherwise, of our own underlying needs, desires and goals. They are marked 
also, I argued, by an essential commitment to collaborative moral endeavor: to finding routes 
through moral space that accommodate multiple perspectives and points of view. Practices of 
public moral discussion and exchange creates, I tried to argue, these kinds of moral sensitivity in 
much the same way as the creation of financial institutions creates the space to trade in stocks, 
shares, options and futures, then options on futures, and so on. In each case the presence of the 
infrastructure is partly constitutive of the very possibility of the target phenomenon. 
 
 
In weak support of this rather strong thesis (the thesis, if you like, of the discursive construction 
of moral space) I offered a couple of more detailed- but admittedly non-moral- exemplars. One 
involved the ability of label-exploiting chimps (pan troglodytes) to grasp kinds of abstraction 
beyond the ken of their un-augmented cousins. The other involved the role of numerals in 
enabling our communal exploration of mathematical space. The idea here, which I should have 
made more explicit, was that despite the clear overlap in base-line neural skills, only the activity 
of the numeral-enhanced humans counts as genuinely mathematical. The very concept of a 
number, I would argue, is available to our species only courtesy of its experiences with the 
artifactual domain of numeral construction and manipulation. What other animals do by way of 
counting is not properly conceived as mathematics in the absence of that overlay, just as their 
skills at social navigation, in the absence of a similar overlay of discursive concepts, do not count 
as moral skills. 
 
The second point of disagreement follows rather directly from the first. While we both agree on 
the possibility of moral progress, we harbor subtly different visions of in what such progress 
might consist. For Professor Churchland progress consists in increased collective success at the 
negotiation of increasingly complex social spaces. I claim, by contrast (at least I think it is by 
contrast-see below) that moral progress consists primarily in increased collective sensitivity to 
the needs, reasons and desires of others. Our communal explorations of moral space serve to 
sculpt and tweak these needs and desires while simultaneously attempting to accommodate as 
wide a variety as possible. Now in practice, I concede (hence my hesitation above) that it will be 
hard indeed to distinguish Churchland's vision from mine. For the typical upshot of all this 
mutual consideration of needs, reasons and arguments should, one hopes, be a smoother, gentler 
social swirl. But the emphasis (on the exchange of reasons versus the navigation of social space) 
strikes me as important. For we make moral progress, I want to claim, only by swimming better 
in a sea of other's needs and reasons, not by simply swimming better in a social sea. 
 
This difference in the conception of the moral domain explains, I think, some of my continued 
resistance to professor Churchland's radical visionary stance concerning the future of folk-
psychology. While agreeing that future human brains may well come to deploy new and better 
modes of thought and reason (for example, by learning, courtesy of games such as SIMCITY, 
better ways to think about complex, decentralized, self-organizing phenomena) I find myself 
unable to conceive of the future morality that by-passes the communal exchange of discursive 
representations. And I lack a conception of in what a post-sentential exchange of reasons and 
justifications might consist (even using a diagram to make a point often depends on some 
accompanying sentential gloss). I am happy to concede, however, that my failures of imagination 
are just that, and no more (they are not (precisely!) arguments). So I now record an open verdict 
on the possible forms of future moral exchange and debate, while still insisting that there must be 
such exchange and debate on pain of failing to re-constitute any genuinely moral realm. Here to 
stay, I claim, must be some form of interpersonal discursive representation capable of providing 
rough summary abstractions of the rich contents encoded in high dimensional state spaces. Such 
abstractions, I argue, play vital roles both in learning and in collaborative thought. In the case at 
hand, such representations do not simply oil the wheels of moral debate, they actively constitute 
the thinking as moral. 
 
More generally, Philosophers of Cognitive Science (with the notable exception of Dan Dennett -
(see e.g. Dennett (1996)),tend to underestimate just how very special we humans are. This 
downplaying is doubtless the result of an otherwise laudable desire to keep things natural and to 
emphasize the deep and real continuities between human cognition and that of other animals. But 
we are different, and the difference is cognitively deep (even if rooted in only some small neural 
difference). To appreciate the difference we must abandon our staunchly brain-and-individual 
oriented stance, and attend equally to the potent cognitive transformations effected by the matrix 
of words and technologies in which we live and think. 
 
Common ground thus marked, and disputed territory highlighted, what is to be done? Here, I 
confess, I am at something of a loss. For all I have done, on reflection, is to present a personal, 
biased picture of in what moral cognition might consist, and to accompany this picture with a 
couple of (notably non-moral) illustrations. The picture is one in which the moral realm comes 
into view, and moral cognition is partially constituted, only by the joint action of neural 
resources we share with other animals and the distinctively human infrastructure of linguaform 
moral debate and reason. 
 
Our status as moral agents depends crucially, if I am right, on the many additional layers of 
cognitive circuitry we have slowly woven into the worlds within which we now think, reason, 
act, build and legislate. But Professor Churchland's vision, so wonderfully expressed and 
powerfully argued in his contribution, stands out as clear and compelling. The moral realm, as he 
depicts it, is one already explored by many social animals, and is not at all the peculiar province 
of the language-and-culture enhanced ('mindware upgraded'- see Clark, In Press) human species. 
Who (if either) is right? And how can we tell? My closing thought is that this is, in all likelihood, 
not exactly an empirical question. The answer depends upon some hard decisions concerning 
which aspects of current moral practice should be foregrounded in our best philosophical and 
scientific treatments of morality. And that, I venture to suggest, may be a moral, rather than a 
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